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Ideas and Opinions
8 September 2015

Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research

Authors: Marc Lipsitch, DPhil, Kevin Esvelt, PhD, and Thomas Inglesby, MDAuthor, Article, & Disclosure Information
Publication: Annals of Internal Medicine
Volume 163, Number 10
https://doi.org/10.7326/M15-1048
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Recently, 18 leading researchers in science and biotechnology published an unprecedented statement in Science calling for great caution in the application of new CRISPR/Cas9 (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats/CRISPR-associated protein 9) technologies to editing of the human germline (1). These technologies allow molecular biologists to modify genomes in ways that were previously difficult or impossible, creating the potential to treat disease by correcting genetic defects. However, these methods also allow genome modification in the germline that would be passed on to the organism's progeny.
The statement called for the development of a thorough understanding of ethics and safety …

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References

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Information & Authors

Information

Published In

cover image Annals of Internal Medicine
Annals of Internal Medicine
Volume 163 • Number 10 • 17 November 2015
Pages: 790 - 791

History

Published online: 8 September 2015
Published in issue: 17 November 2015

Keywords

  1. Disclosure
  2. Epidemiology
  3. Genetic diseases
  4. Pathogens
  5. Population statistics
  6. Prevention, policy, and public health
  7. Research laboratories
  8. Risk assessments
  9. Safety
  10. Scientists

Copyright

© 2015 American College of Physicians.

Authors

Affiliations

Marc Lipsitch, DPhil
From Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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Kevin Esvelt, PhD
From Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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Thomas Inglesby, MD
From Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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Financial Support: Dr. Lipsitch received sabbatical funding from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Dr. Esvelt is supported by the Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering. Dr. Inglesby is supported by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
Corresponding Author: Marc Lipsitch, DPhil, Professor of Epidemiology, Director, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Avenue, Kresge Building, Room 506G, Boston, MA 02115.
Current Author Addresses: Dr. Lipsitch: Professor of Epidemiology, Director, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Avenue, Kresge Building, Room 506G, Boston, MA 02115.
Dr. Esvelt: Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard Medical School, CLSB 528-2C, 3 Blackfan Circle, Boston, MA 02115.
Dr. Inglesby: UPMC Center for Biosecurity, 621 East Pratt Street, Suite 210, Baltimore, MD 21202.
Author Contributions: Conception and design: M. Lipsitch, T. Inglesby.
Drafting of the article: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.
Critical revision of the article for important intellectual content: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.
Final approval of the article: M. Lipsitch, K. Esvelt, T. Inglesby.
Administrative, technical, or logistic support: T. Inglesby.
This article was published online first at www.annals.org on 8 September 2015.

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Marc Lipsitch, Kevin Esvelt, Thomas Inglesby. Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research. Ann Intern Med.2015;163:790-791. [Epub 8 September 2015]. doi:10.7326/M15-1048

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